Stop buying into M.A.D — it’s time for nuclear defensive deterrence to be our posture instead

🌈 Abstract

The article discusses the need to move away from the Mutually Assured Destruction (M.A.D.) nuclear policy and instead adopt a Defensive Deterrence approach to reduce the risk of nuclear war. It proposes several policy changes, including:

• Improving nuclear tracking capabilities of major powers like Russia and China
• Setting up global ICBM launch communication channels
• Pulling back stationing of nuclear arms to sovereign borders
• Changing ICBM trajectories to avoid flying over major nuclear powers
• Negotiating a settlement in Ukraine in exchange for joint nuclear policies
• Improving last-stage missile defense for major cities

The article argues that these changes could help reduce the risk of nuclear mistakes and escalation, making nuclear policy more focused on defensive deterrence rather than offensive escalation.

🙋 Q&A

[01] Improving Nuclear Tracking Capabilities

1. What is the rationale for improving nuclear tracking capabilities of major powers like Russia and China? The article states that major miscalculation could come from poor radar and tracking capability. By improving the nuclear tracking capability of all major powers, it would reduce the risk of them seeing a false positive launch, which could trigger an unnecessary nuclear response.

2. How does the article propose to achieve this? The article suggests that the US should actively support Russia and China to upgrade their nuclear tracking capabilities. This would help reduce the risk of mistakes and improve nuclear power relations between the major powers.

[02] Global ICBM Launch Communication Channels

1. Why does the article propose setting up global ICBM launch communication channels? The article argues that if a rogue nation launches a nuclear strike, there should be established channels for the responding nation to quickly notify other major powers about the launch. This would help reduce reliance on a single leader's communication and decrease the risk of miscalculation.

2. What further agreements does the article suggest could be made around these communication channels? The article proposes that nuclear powers could agree that a nuclear attack on one is an attack on all. This would increase the risk for rogue nations to launch first and encourage major powers to work together to stop nuclear threats.

[03] Pulling Back Nuclear Arms to Sovereign Borders

1. What is the rationale behind pulling back the stationing of nuclear arms to sovereign borders? The article argues that deploying nuclear arms near sovereign borders, similar to the Soviet deployment in Cuba, is mainly for rapid first-strike capability. Pulling them back within each country's borders would lengthen reaction times in the event of a launch, potentially giving more time for communication and de-escalation.

[04] Changing ICBM Trajectories

1. Why does the article propose changing ICBM trajectories to avoid flying over major nuclear powers? The article states that ICBM trajectories that fly over major powers like Russia can spook them and increase the risk of miscalculation. Changing the trajectories to avoid overflying major powers could help reduce this risk.

[05] Ukraine Settlement and Nuclear Policy

1. What is the proposed settlement for the Ukraine war, and how does it relate to nuclear policy? The article suggests negotiating a settlement where the US agrees to remove nuclear weapons and bombers from NATO countries near Russia, in exchange for Russia cooperating on sanctions against rogue states and enhancing its nuclear tracking capabilities. This would reduce the nuclear threat perception for Russia and potentially improve its negotiating position with Ukraine.

[06] Improving Last-Stage Missile Defense

1. What is the rationale behind improving last-stage or terminal missile defense systems for major cities? The article argues that since ICBMs are proliferating, it makes sense to have a distributed network of missile defense systems to protect population centers, rather than relying on a single, expensive system. Improving terminal missile defense could help minimize the impact of nuclear strikes on cities.

2. How does the article estimate the cost of implementing such a system for a country like Australia? The article estimates that implementing THAAD and Aegis missile defense systems for Australia's major cities and a regional air base would cost around 5% of the country's defense budget, which it deems a relatively affordable solution.