Language is NOT about the World

🌈 Abstract

The article discusses different theories of linguistic meaning and their relationship to the external world. It outlines the traditional views of language representing ideas and concepts, and then presents Wittgenstein's critique of the truth-conditional theory of meaning. The article explores how Wittgenstein's "meaning as use" theory challenges the direct connection between language and the world, leaving language in a precarious position without a clear alternative to reference.

🙋 Q&A

[01] Traditional Theories of Meaning

1. What are the two traditional theories of meaning outlined in the article?

• The article discusses two traditional theories of meaning:
  • Language represents ideas and judgments about the world, which are derived from empirical experience.
  • Language represents mind-independent concepts and their referents in the world.

2. How does each theory connect language to the world?

• In the first view, language is connected to the world through the representation of ideas and judgments, which are derived from empirical experience.
• In the Fregean view, language is connected to the world through reference, where words pick out objects in the world and make claims about the relationships between them.

3. What is the key difference between these two views?

• The key difference is that the first view sees language as representing subjective ideas, while the Fregean view sees language as representing objective concepts.

[02] Wittgenstein's Critique of Truth-Conditional Semantics

1. What is Wittgenstein's critique of the truth-conditional theory of meaning?

• Wittgenstein argues that not all propositions operate in a truth-conditional manner, as there are logical and metaphysical propositions that lack truth conditions.
• He claims that truth-conditional semantics can only make trivially true statements, as it simply compares a statement to itself rather than revealing anything about the nature of the world.

2. What is the "saying-showing" distinction that Wittgenstein introduces?

• The "saying-showing" distinction suggests that while language can "say" (express) certain states of affairs, it cannot "show" or express the underlying metaphysical and logical concepts that are presupposed by language.

3. How does Wittgenstein's "meaning as use" theory challenge the connection between language and the world?

• By redefining meaning as the use of words within language games, rather than their reference to the world, Wittgenstein's theory removes the direct connection between language and the external world that was present in the previous theories.

[03] Implications of Wittgenstein's View

1. What problem does the article identify with applying the "saying-showing" distinction to Wittgenstein's "meaning as use" theory?

• The article notes that the "saying-showing" distinction was derived in the context of a truth-conditional theory of meaning, and it is not clear how it can be applied to a use theory of meaning where there are no sentences or words that lack meaning.

2. What does the article suggest about the status of language's connection to the world in Wittgenstein's view?

• The article concludes that Wittgenstein's theory leaves language disconnected from the world, with at most a grounding in social conventions or practicality, rather than a direct referential connection.

3. How does the article characterize the impact of Wittgenstein's challenges to the language-world relationship?

• The article suggests that Wittgenstein's work has "opened the door for new approaches to language and its relationship to the world," even though he did not provide a clear alternative to the traditional views.